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Abstract We investigate the effect of culture on corporate governance using the
extraordinary opportunity that the corporate landscape of Switzerland provides.
Within a single institutional framework (e.g., Swiss federal corporate law), we use
language (German and French) and religion (Roman Catholicism and Protestantism)
as proxies for culture. These groups share a distinct set of values particularly in their
tolerance for hierarchical structures. We observe that firms in Swiss–French areas
and firms in Roman Catholic cantons are more likely to have one-tier boards,
whereas two-tier boards are more prevalent in Swiss–German areas and Protestant
cantons. Furthermore, board composition is significantly driven by language. In
contrast, ownership and equity structure are not significantly related to culture.
Keywords Corporate governance  Board of directors  Ownership structure 
Culture  Language  Religion
1 Introduction
Economists often aim to explain cross-country heterogeneity in terms of economic
features such as financial development, business practices or corporate governance
(see Djankov et al. 2003; Aguilera and Jackson 2010). Typically, corporate
governance can be seen as a set of devices aimed to protect (minority) shareholders
against managerial misbehaviour or misbehaving (large) shareholders (see e.g.,
Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Corporate governance is a crucial success factor in a
firm’s strategy. However, striking international differences have been found in
important elements of corporate governance such as the structures of the board of
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directors (Wymeersch 1998) and corporate ownership (La Porta et al. 1999a; Faccio
and Lang 2002).
Due to the close relationship between corporate governance and the legal system,
the law and finance theory has provided the reference for explaining the various
corporate governance regimes around the world (see e.g., La Porta et al. 1998). The
theory of legal origins assumes that common law countries and their respective
systems of corporate governance (i.e., minority investor protection, dispersed
ownership, and takeover activity) are related to better economic outcomes relative
to civil law countries (see e.g., La Porta et al. 2008). Higher investor protection
results in a more efficient allocation of capital. In consequence, it is believed that
introducing elements of Anglo-American corporate governance practices would
potentially improve economic development. However, such corporate governance
reforms have not per se led to greater stock market development (Armour et al.
2009). We can still observe a variety of corporate control structures around the
globe. Doidge et al. (2007) find that country characteristics explain the variation of a
firm’s governance better than firm characteristics can. The convergence process is
hampered by factors at the firm level, but also at the institutional and the national
level (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Denis and McConnell 2003; Buck and Shahrim
2005; Yoshikawa et al. 2007).
Some researchers thus claim that culture may play an important role in corporate
governance practices around the world (Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Buck and Shahrim
2005; Clarke and dela Rama 2006; Aguilera and Jackson 2010). International
organizations such as the World Bank, the IMF, the OECD or large pension funds
such as CalPERS share this view (see Licht 2001). For instance, the business
practices of American, Japanese or German managers differ, and this is likely to be
associated with their underlying culture.
However, culture is a complex concept and is often regarded as a black box. In
his seminal work, Hofstede (1980) defines culture as a shared set of values which
separates one group of people from another. Culture is seen as being the expression
of the aggregate of common individual personalities forming a group. Beliefs,
values and norms constitute a ‘‘collective programming of the mind’’ which is deep-
rooted in society and therefore changes only very slowly from one generation to the
next (Hofstede 1980, p. 25). Licht (2001) denotes culture as the ‘‘mother of all path
dependencies’’, suggesting that culture is fundamental to an explanation of the
global differences in corporate governance. Proponents of the new institutional
theory argue that both informal institutions (e.g., culture) and formal institutions
(e.g., laws) constitute the ‘‘rules of the game’’ according to which individuals and
organizations interact. In consequence, (both) institutions affect economic outcomes
(e.g., management practices, economic growth) directly and indirectly (North 1990,
p. 3; Williamson 2000). Lowe (1998) contends that culture is important in the
transmission process from old to new institutions combining the two perspectives.
Hence, it is widely acknowledged that culture directly (Hofstede 1980) or indirectly
via (formal) institutions (Williamson 2000) is important in explaining economic
outcomes. However, there are various relationships between culture, institutions,
corporate governance, firm performance and economic growth. Another important
problem in evaluating and operationalizing culture lies in its measurement (see e.g.,
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Shenkar 2001). Hofstede’s basic framework measures cross-cultural differences
along four dimensions of national culture (power distance, uncertainty avoidance,
individualism, and masculinity) using survey data (see also Schwartz 1999). While
some studies rely on such classifications of culture (e.g., Licht et al. 2005, 2007; Li
and Harrison 2008; Siegel et al. 2011) or measures of cultural distance derived from
Hofstede’s cultural indices (e.g., Kogut and Singh 1988), other studies rely on more
easily observable characteristics such as a country’s predominant language or
religion (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju 2001; Stulz and Williamson 2003; Guiso
et al. 2003, 2006). Groups which speak the same language or believe in the same
religion often share the same values. These values can also be identified in
Hofstede’s typology of cultural dimensions. However, both cultural dimensions and
cultural proxies often overlap with countries and thereby their institutions. For
instance, Protestantism, English and common law are commonly linked character-
istics which are associated with similar corporate governance regimes.
This study investigates the effect of culture on corporate governance using the
cultural pluralism within one country and one single institutional system:
Switzerland. Culture is proxied by language (French and German) and religion
(Roman Catholic and Protestant) which are the most important factors in
Switzerland’s cultural pluralism (see Mayer 1951).1,2 The literature shows that
there are significant cultural differences between German-speaking people and
French-speaking people as well as between Protestants and Catholics. Most
importantly, French, Swiss–French, and Roman Catholics tend to tolerate hierar-
chical structures and strong leadership. In contrast, German, Swiss–German, and
Protestants tend to be skeptical towards a concentration of power (see e.g., Hofstede
1980; Stulz and Williamson 2003).3
The distribution of power within the corporation determines the relationships
between managers, controlling shareholders and (minority) shareholders and
corporate governance aims to mitigate potential conflicts between these parties.
We focus in our study on two relevant features of corporate governance: board of
directors and ownership structure. In particular, we evaluate the impact of culture on
board structures, board composition, and ownership structure. Firstly, in Switzer-
land, corporations can choose between two forms of board structure: one-tier and
two-tier boards. The more hierarchical one-tier board consists of executives
(insiders and, most frequently, the chief executive officer, CEO) and non-executive
directors (outsiders) who, together, within one centralized corporate body conduct
daily business and monitor the management. A two-tier board, on the other hand,
consists of a management board and a supervisory board. The day-to-day
1 We restrict our analysis to Swiss–French and Swiss–German areas, because there are only four listed
firms in the Italian-speaking area of Switzerland and none in the Rhaeto-Romanic area.
2 In a similar setting, Belgium’s two important language regions, Flanders and Wallonia are culturally
influenced by The Netherlands and France. However, unlike Switzerland, most firms are located in the
bilingual Brussels area, and corporate governance does not seem to differ significantly between the two
regions. In addition, Belgium has only one predominant religion which is Roman Catholic. We are
grateful to Stijn De Dier (KU Leuven) for pointing us out the situation in Belgium.
3 To our knowledge, no empirical studies have used Hofstede’s cultural dimension scores on the different
Swiss regions other than the two language regions.
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management of the corporation is delegated to a management board which is
completely separate from the supervisory board. Splitting the corporation’s highest
level of authority into an executive and control function increases the (supervisory)
board’s independence, promotes the sharing of tasks and responsibilities, and
reduces the concentration of power. Secondly, culture also appears to affect board
composition, as board members’ values and beliefs determine not only who is
selected for board membership but also which decisions are made and consequently
how the firm is directed. Directors may be chosen because they share the same
values as the other board members, and these values are likely to correspond to
those of the regional culture of the firm’s headquarters. These shared values may
result in a uniform and distinct management style. Thirdly, the separation of
ownership from control shapes the principal–agent relationships within corpora-
tions. Strong shareholders have a significant influence on the board and the
corporation as a whole by using their voting rights. In more hierarchically-oriented
cultures, ownership may therefore be more concentrated, especially if controlling
shareholders benefit from a multiple class equity structure.
In our study, we relate distinct features of culture directly to corporate
governance structures, holding institutional factors constant. We contribute to the
discussion of the effect of culture on corporate governance practices for three main
reasons. First of all, culture is generally difficult to operationalize. We use two
languages (German and French) and two religions (Roman Catholicism and
Protestantism) as measures for culture. Each of these two proxies is presumed to be
linked to different tolerances for hierarchical structures and therefore have a
potential impact on corporate governance. Such an approach was also recommended
by Siegel et al. (2011) as a promising fruitful way to study economic outcomes.
Secondly, culture is difficult to distinguish from other institutional factors within
a country. Our empirical study is based on a single country which enables us to
isolate the effect of culture, because the legal origins and the legal and political
system as well as its economic or financial developments are held constant.
Switzerland is an old stable and federally organized direct democracy which has a
developed capital market, an open economy, and strong multinational corporations.
It is therefore likely that corporate governance follows culture, and not vice versa.
Furthermore, in contrast to the United States, where state law can significantly differ
between federated states and firms can choose corporate law by selecting the state in
which they wish to be incorporated (e.g., Delaware, see Daines 2001), Swiss federal
law fully defines corporate law throughout Switzerland.4
Thirdly, culture is rarely used as a determinant of corporate governance practices
in empirical studies. Mostly, the effect of culture has been investigated on various
other economic outcomes. In addition to ownership structure, we use the structure of
the board of directors and the boards’ composition to investigate differences in
corporate governance across cultures. The board is an essential component of
corporate governance (see Demb and Neubauer 1992). As a notable exception, Li
4 Cantonal (state) law differs in some cases (e.g., tax law) and law enforcement is usually delegated to
Switzerland’s 26 cantons. The Securities Exchange Act (SEC) of 1934 is an example of a federal law in
the United States.
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and Harrison (2008) use Hofstede’s measures to examine the effect of culture on
board independence and CEO duality. Licht (2001) argues that some factors such as
the mandatory two-tier board structure cannot be investigated owing to a limited
number of countries where they exist (e.g., Germany and The Netherlands) and a
lack of variation in board structure due to its mandatory nature, thereby preventing
any meaningful empirical analyses. We, however, are able to investigate this
feature, because both board structures (one-tier and two-tier) are allowed by law and
are equally prevalent in Switzerland.
This paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 reviews the relevant literature and
develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the variables, and the
empirical analysis is presented in Sect. 4. Section 5 concludes.
2 Theory and Hypotheses
2.1 Institutions, Culture, and Corporate Governance
Diversity in corporate governance regimes is often explained by law and finance
theory. It has been argued that corporate laws, and thus also corporate governance
regimes, are determined by the fundamental principles that underlie their respective
legal systems (e.g., civil or common law) (see e.g., La Porta et al. 1998, 1999a,
2000). Differences in corporate governance structures, notably ownership structures,
are seen as a consequence of the origins of their legal system. This affiliation is
especially evident in the case of British common law or French civil law. It is
argued that the historico-cultural foundation of a country’s legal system determines
its subsequent corporate governance structures.
At least, in the aftermath of the corporate failures, fraud, and accounting scandals
and the Asian Crisis which occurred around 2000, corporate governance reforms
have become a major topic around the world. Denis and McConnell (2003) find
some converging tendencies across jurisdictions (see also Hansmann and Kraakman
2000). However, firm-specific factors hamper the adoption of so-called best
practices in corporate governance. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) argue that corporate
governance is path-dependent and persistence in the form of corporate governance
is determined by the country’s initial or historical environment (see also Roe 1999;
Rajan and Zingales 2003). Aguilera and Jackson (2003) contend that best practices
are adapted and lead to distinct hybrid corporate governance systems. This
development is driven by the cross-border interactions of economic actors (e.g.,
institutional shareholders). Khanna et al. (2006) find evidence that corporate
governance laws between economically interdependent countries converge, but that
corporate governance practices do not. Thus, although globalization has led to some
convergence in corporate governance standards, corporate governance practices still
differ around the world, and while the institutional environment of a country is
important, it cannot sufficiently explain the persistence of corporate governance
systems around the world.
Corporate governance systems evolve in line with their cultural and historical
settings; they also develop in response to shareholder structures and the capital
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market environment (Hopt and Leyens 2004). Culture results from and affects
behaviours and values, and is therefore likely to affect political regimes, the legal
system and norms, corporate goals and values, and consequently corporate finance
and governance (see Lu¨pold and Schnyder 2009; Daniel et al. 2012).
It is therefore obvious for researchers to include culture in their analyses on
corporate finance and governance (see; Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Clarke and dela
Rama 2006; Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Daniel et al. 2012). As a result, culture has
been analyzed as a determinant of various economic outcomes. It has been
associated with economic growth (Franke et al. 1991), economic development
(Glahe and Vohries 1989), financial intermediation (Aggarwal and Goodell 2010),
international capital flows (Siegel et al. 2011), capital structure (Chui et al. 2002),
the firm’s choice of entry (Tihanyi et al. 2005; Slangen and van Tulder 2009),
financial development (Beck et al. 2003), government quality (La Porta et al.
1999b), and life insurance consumption (Beck and Webb 2003).
Some studies investigate culture as a determinant of corporate governance with
regard to investor protection (Stulz and Williamson 2003), board of directors (Li
and Harrison 2008), or mergers and acquisitions (Stahl and Voigt 2008). Dyck and
Zingales (2004) show that (minority) shareholder protection, measured by the level
of private benefits of control, is also affected by cultural norms. Shareholders fear
negative public opinion and reputation costs if the media uncover bad shareholder
behavior. Despite these notable exceptions, culture is often neglected in compar-
ative studies on corporate governance (see Aguilera and Jackson 2010).
The measurement of culture presents two main challenges. Firstly, because
culture is often identified at a country-level, and is measured together with other
national (institutional) characteristics (e.g., the respective legal system), it is
analytically difficult to isolate cultural-specific effects. Furthermore, culture is often
viewed as a national factor and intra-country cultural heterogeneity is therefore
ignored. And secondly, there are no clear variables that constitute culture and that
are observable.
Buck and Shahrim (2005) study the effect of national culture on governance
systems, namely the Anglo-American versus the Germanic system. Specifically,
they describe the process of introducing a typical element of U.S. corporate
governance in Germany: executive stock option programs. The process of
introducing these programs in Germany was different from that in America, as
the local institutional context and the boundaries of Germanic welfare capitalism
have been given due consideration. Similarly, Yoshikawa et al. (2007) show that the
introduction of some Anglo-American corporate governance practices in Japan was
subjected to debate at firm and at institutional level, which resulted in Japanese
firms adapting them to suit the limits of the country’s context. Both of these case
studies explain how governance practices evolve as hybrid systems, displaying
elements of path dependence and convergence.
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory has been widely used as a measure of
culture and is well established in the international management literature. Other
studies have proxied culture by more easily observable characteristics, namely
language and religion. For instance, Stulz and Williamson (2003) underline the
importance of culture with regard to investor protection issues, in particular, and
82 C. Volonte´
123
finance, in general, arguing that a country’s values depend on its culture (e.g., the
ethos of levying interest on loans), that culture affects institutions (e.g., the legal
system and property rights), and the allocation of resources (e.g., church spending).
Having investigated 49 countries, they show that religion is a better predictor of
investor protection than language.
2.1.1 Language
Hofstede (1980) considers language to be the most important and recognizable
element of culture, and assumes that people speaking the same language within a
specific territory share a common culture. Stulz and Williamson (2003) suggest that
a common language facilitates the exchange of information, and Grinblatt and
Keloharju (2001) also identified the association between separate languages and
cultural effects. In fact, countries which form cultural clusters are often countries
that share the same primary language or belong to the same language family (e.g.,
English, French, Spanish, and German) (see Ronen and Shenkar 1985, for a survey).
While there are sufficient grounds to assume that language is a satisfactory proxy for
culture, very often a language is also associated with particular institutional features
and a specific religion. Interestingly, Chakrabarti et al. (2008) find that language,
religion, and legal origins are highly correlated with Hofstede’s cultural measures.
Focusing on governance norms and laws, Licht et al. (2007) and Siegel et al. (2011)
find empirical evidence confirming the relevance of Schwartz’s and Hofstede’s
cultural dimension of hierarchy. Several observers have suggested that the French
are inclined to accept hierarchical structures and centralized authority in contrast to
Germans who are more egalitarian and prefer decentralization (see Hofstede 1980;
Bebchuk and Roe 1999; Licht 2001). According to Hofstede’s (2013) cultural
dimensions, the French-speaking Swiss follow the French characterization and
display a higher power distance score than German-speaking Swiss (see Table 11 in
the Appendix).
2.1.2 Religion
Religion is another important expression of culture and a relevant factor that might
explain the values, norms, and beliefs of people (see Williamson 2000). In its
different guises, religion gives society rules for behavioral relationships (see e.g., La
Porta et al. 1999b; Stulz and Williamson 2003). Most prominently, Weber (1930)
argues that the work ethic of Protestants (compared to Catholics) is an immensely
important factor in explaining economic development. According to Weber (1930),
the Calvinist Reformation was crucial for the development of capitalism and its
institutions, because Protestant theology fosters hard work and prepared the way for
capitalist industrialization.5 Several studies empirically document that religion has
an effect on economic performance (Glahe and Vohries 1989; Noland 2005), the
5 As a matter of fact, many French Protestant Huguenots fled from France and established the watch-
making industry in the Swiss Jura mountains.
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level of creditor rights (Stulz and Williamson 2003), the quality of government (La
Porta et al. 1999b), and corporate decisions (Hilary and Hui 2009).
However, Becker and Woessmann (2009) identify the rate of literacy as the
reason for higher economic prosperity in Protestant societies. There is strong
empirical evidence that beliefs (especially trust), values and attitudes associated
with religion, rather than religion itself, affect economic outcomes (see La Porta
et al. 1997; Barro and McCleary 2003; Guiso et al. 2006; Arrunada 2010; Hayward
and Kemmelmeier 2011). Protestants exhibit a higher level of trust in contrast to
Catholics, which promotes trade and thereby economic development (La Porta et al.
1997; Glaeser and Glendon 1998; Guiso et al. 2006). In terms of transaction cost
theory, trust can be considered as lowering transaction costs through reliance on the
market price mechanism, instead of incurring increased costs through having to
trade within an organization’s hierarchy.
Religion and trust are therefore also related to organizational issues. Stulz and
Williamson (2003) contend that the Calvinist Reformation promoted decentraliza-
tion and the creation of multiple churches, and aimed to guard against concentra-
tions of power. In contrast, Roman Catholicism, which is recognized as a religion
whose congregations place their trust in people ‘‘who know more’’, has a centralized
hierarchical structure with the Pope as its authoritative head (Levine 1979; La Porta
et al. 1999b; Stulz and Williamson 2003, p. 319). The strong adherence that Roman
Catholics are noted for having towards the hierarchical organization of their church
and its apex of authority is thought to reduce their liaison with broader society (see
Putnam 1993; La Porta et al. 1997). The cultural acceptance of hierarchical
institutions, which in linking levels of authority nevertheless divide and separate
them, is conceptually represented as being ‘vertical’. This conceptualization of a
vertical organizational structure is also represented by Hofstede’s indicator power
distance. Research identifies Roman Catholics as having a higher power distance
score (greater tolerance for hierarchy) than Protestants (see Tang and Koveos 2008).
2.2 Hypotheses
Corporate governance aims to mitigate potential conflicts between managers or
controlling shareholders and (minority) shareholders. The distribution of power
within a corporation plays an important role in determining the nature of these
different interrelationships. Religious or language groups share certain values which
are likely to determine the form of corporate governance that is adopted by the
firms.6 Two important features of corporate governance are the board of directors
and the ownership structure. However, culture, which is multi-faceted, may affect
corporate governance through different channels. For instance, features of culture
(e.g., individualism) affect economic outcomes through institutional arrangements
(e.g., education) which are favored by specific cultural values (e.g., Protestantism).
In addition, cultural characteristics and institutional features often appear simul-
taneously (e.g., English and common law origin or French and civil law origin). The
6 In democracies, the governance of the state is characterized by a separation of powers between the
legislature, the executive, and the judiciary.
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literature on culture shows that there are significant differences along the
dimensions of values. Based on his definitions, Hofstede characterizes the
German-speaking people’s character as being independent and skeptical towards
a concentration of power, and the French or Swiss–French character as tending to
tolerate hierarchical structures and strong leaders.7 France and Germany, the
countries which are mostly associated with the French and German language, have
different types of corporate governance regimes (see La Porta et al. 2000). Goyer
(2006) perceives cultural differences between French and Germans in terms of their
work ethic. Germans are more likely to share authority with their work force, while
French organizations are more hierarchical. Hence, the different systems of value in
the French and in the German cultural environment have led (potentially via legal
rules) to different corporate governance structures. The French have a tendency to
tolerate hierarchies and the concentration of power, while Germans tend to separate
responsibilities. Similarly, Roman Catholics are described as having a significantly
higher power distance score than Protestants who are associated with a preference of
decentralization.
2.2.1 One-Tier versus Two-Tier Boards
The distribution of power and therefore the hierarchical organization of a
corporation are especially apparent in the structure of the board of directors.
Boards can be classified broadly as two-tier (dual) boards or one-tier (unitary)
boards (see Douma 1997; Jungmann 2006). In the former case, each board has a
clearly separate function, the one supervisory and the other executive. The
supervisory board appoints and monitors the management (executive) board, and
oversees its compliance with the law and the articles of incorporation. In the latter
case, the board (or part of it, e.g. a delegate, CEO, or committee) also manages daily
business. Hence, one-tier boards consolidate the functions of control and decision
management.
In practice, board structures between Germany and France differ substantially,
and reflect these countries’ cultural values. The traditional board structure in France
is one-tiered and therefore consists of executive (i.e., full-time employees with
internal know-how) and non-executive directors. These boards are commonly
directed by a strong leader who combines both functions of CEO and chairman
(‘‘pre´sident-directeur-ge´ne´rale’’ or ‘‘PDG’’) and who, hence, has extensive decision-
power (Hopt and Leyens 2004; Storck 2004; Millet-Reyes and Zhao 2010).8 In
contrast, in Germany (and Austria), supervisory and executive tasks are separated
7 These characterizations are provided by Hofstede (2013) (http://geert-hofstede.com). Hofstede’s basic
framework measures cross-cultural differences assigned to four dimensions of national culture (power
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity). Here, it should be noted that both the
Swiss–Germans and the Swiss–French share an equally individualistic character (in contrast to collec-
tivist), both believe in competition as a valid means to achieve merited job promotions (believed to a
lesser extent in French-speaking Switzerland), and share a preference for avoiding uncertainty (more so in
the French-speaking areas).
8 Since 2001, French firms have been able to choose between a one-tier board structure (‘‘conseil
d’administration’’) and a two-tier structure (‘‘conseil de surveillance’’ and ‘‘directoire’’); nevertheless,
only 23 % of French firms have opted for the two-tier board structure (Heidrick and Struggles 2011).
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by law and are allocated, respectively, to a supervisory board and a management
board, which establishes a clear division of responsibilities (two-tier board
structure). In other words, no executive manager is active on the board of directors,
as this board has a purely supervisory function.
Swiss law gives all corporate fiduciary duties to one board of directors (one-tier),
however, the board is free to delegate (transferable) duties relating to daily business
to one or more board members (a delegate or an executive committee) or a separate
management team (in the sense of a two-tier board structure). Swiss law enables
firms to adopt the structure which is best suited to their corporate goals, and because
the board constitutes itself, it can fairly be assumed that there is a cultural impact on
the board’s structure. It is assumed that the cultural values which are embedded in
specific languages and religions are clearly manifested in the way corporate
structures allocate power. Because a corporate structure and the way it distributes
power are linked to values which are culturally carried by language and religion, it
may be hypothesized that there should be a higher incidence of corporations which
have hierarchical corporate structures in Swiss–French areas and Roman Catholic
cantons (states).
Hypothesis 1: One-tier boards (in contrast to two-tier boards) are more
prevalent in Swiss–French areas relative to Swiss–German areas and in
Roman Catholic cantons relative to Protestant cantons.
2.2.2 Board Composition
Culture affects the level of trust which is closely related to both language and
religion. Guiso et al. (2009) find significant differences in the capacity for trust
between managers in Europe which they ascribe to different cultural heritages and
home-country bias. In behavioral finance, home or familiarity bias has also been
observed with respect to stock ownership. Investors tend to invest in firms that they
are familiar with and share the same language and culture with (see Grinblatt and
Keloharju 2001; Becker et al. 2008; Kang and Kim 2008). More generally, we
observe, for example, that labor mobility within the European Union is hampered by
language and culture (see Nickell 1997). People tend to migrate within familiar
environments.9
Board members are elected by their shareholders, but typically they are selected
by the board itself. Either way, the election is potentially affected by the cultural
stance that is expected to be promoted by the candidate. Directors may be elected
because they share the same culture. Because it is difficult to identify a director’s
religion and find out how he or she is practicing religion, the cultural similarity of
directors is measured using the primary language they speak.
Hypothesis 2: Boards are composed by directors who share the same primary
language with the firm’s headquarters’ location.
9 For instance, there are relatively more Germans in the German-speaking towns of Basel and Zurich, and
there are relatively more French in the French-speaking town of Geneva (see Table 12 in ‘‘Appendix’’).
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2.2.3 Ownership Structure and Multiple Classes of Equity
Cross-country heterogeneity in ownership structures is one of the central topics in
comparative corporate governance studies (Denis and McConnell 2003; Aguilera
and Jackson 2010). Ownership structure is an important factor in corporate
governance and shapes the agency relationships within firms. While in Anglo-Saxon
countries corporate ownership is dispersed and corporations are mostly widely held,
in the rest of the world, including Switzerland, France, and Germany, many firms
are controlled by one important shareholder, e.g., a family (see La Porta et al.
1999a; Faccio and Lang 2002). Attempts to explain ownership concentrations
around the world have argued that self-regulation of stock exchanges (Coffee 2001),
initial ownership structures and the pressure of interest groups (Bebchuk and Roe
1999), skepticism towards the concentration of power on Wall Street (Roe 1991),
new corporate laws introduced in the 1930s (Gillan and Starks 2007; Lu¨pold and
Schnyder 2009), or economic actors and merger waves (Aguilera and Jackson 2003)
have led to changes in ownership structures. Combining law and culture, Bozec
et al. (2008) and Boubraki et al. (2011) show that Canadian firms in the French-
speaking province of Que´bec have a higher ownership concentration than firms in
the other (English-speaking) provinces. However, Que´bec firms, unlike Swiss firms,
can choose to incorporate under Canadian federal law (based on common law) or
under the Que´bec provincial law (based on civil law).10 They reveal that
incorporation under the civil law regime is significantly positively related to the
ownership concentration. Therefore, they confirm that the legal system is an
important determinant of ownership concentration. This leaves doubt as to whether
culture or legal rules are more important in explaining ownership structures. Licht
(2001) argues that the Western European tendency to support egalitarianism
opposes the prevalence of blockholding. Conversely, concentrated ownership could
be explained by uncertainty avoidance and less stock ownership held by the general
population. Interestingly, Guiso et al. (2003) find that Catholics value private
ownership and competition more than Protestants. The tendency to accept strong
leadership is likely to be positively related to cumulated voting rights. Furthermore,
a tolerance for hierarchical structures and risk avoidance are likely to lead to equity
structures that decouple voting from cash flow rights and the associated financial
risks.
Hypothesis 3a: Ownership concentration is higher in Swiss–French areas
relative to Swiss–German areas and in Roman Catholic cantons relative to
Protestant cantons.
Hypothesis 3b: Multiple-class firms are more prevalent in Swiss–French areas
relative to Swiss–German areas and in Roman Catholic cantons relative to
Protestant cantons.
10 All three countries’ (Switzerland, Germany, and France) legal system is based on civil law (in contrast
to common law).
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3 Data and Definition of Variables
Switzerland provides an excellent case for studying the effects of culture on
corporate governance, because Swiss firms exhibit two important cultural charac-
teristics: language and religion.11 In particular, all firms are subject to the same
institutional environment; notably, one (federal) corporate law that applies for all
firms. Swiss corporate law leaves substantial leeway to firms regarding corporate
governance. For example, the law allows all firms to decide how to structure their
boards (i.e., one-tier or two-tiers). In our literature review, we document potential
differences in attitudes towards a concentration of power between Swiss–Germans
and Swiss–French, and Roman Catholics and Protestants. Both the Swiss–French
and Roman Catholics tend to tolerate a concentration of power, while the Swiss–
Germans and Protestants tend to prefer a dispersion of power. We examine the
effect of culture on corporate governance by comparing firms incorporated in the
German- and the French-speaking part of Switzerland, as well as in Roman Catholic
and Protestant cantons. We use a t test for the comparison of the mean values and a
Wilcoxon rank sum-test of the equality of medians to compare corporate
governance.12 In addition, we use Logit regressions for our binary board and
equity structure variables and Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions for our
board composition and ownership variables controlling for other firm
characteristics.
3.1 The Swiss Confederation
Using culture to explain different economic outcomes is appealing, but difficult to
investigate. In our case, Switzerland provides two language regions (65 % of the
Swiss are German-speaking and 18 % are French-speaking) and two different
religions (42 % of the Swiss are Roman Catholic and 35 % are Protestant).13 Swiss
cultures ‘‘are strongly influenced by the cultures of Switzerland’s neighbors, France,
Germany, and Italy’’.14 Mayer (1951) contends that languages and religions define
the cultural pluralism of Switzerland.
Switzerland is an old and stable (direct) democracy and confederation, consisting
of 26 cantons. The foundation of Switzerland in 1291 was the consequence of a
group of communities’ desire for independence and security against enemies and
foreign control. The country has been a federal republic since 1848. As a result of
this common cause, the Swiss grew together and created a ‘‘national equilibrium’’
11 Firms can thus be defined as Swiss-French and Protestant, Swiss-French and Roman Catholic, Swiss–
German and Protestant or Swiss–German and Roman Catholic.
12 The two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum-test (or Mann–Whitney-test or U-test) verifies the null hypothesis
that the true location shift of two distributions is equal to zero. Following a number of other studies, we
verify the equality of medians using this test (e.g., Fahlenbrach et al. 2010).
13 CIA––The World Factbook: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html
(access on 12/09/2012).
14 Official webpage of the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs: http://www.eda.admin.ch/eda/en/
home/doc/infoch/chcul.html (access on 12/09/2012).
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formed by cultural differences (Mayer 1951). Switzerland is often referred to as a
country forged by the will of the people (‘‘Willensnation’’).
The federal structure counters power concentration at the highest federal level.
There are basically three levels of checks and balances (federal, cantonal, and
community). As a result of these hurdles, significant political changes are typically
rare. The principle of subsidiarity and the direct democracy are the two most
important elements of politics in Switzerland.
In relation to language, almost all listed corporations are located either in the
German-speaking part or in the French-speaking part of Switzerland (see Footnote
1). The linguistic demarcation line is referred to as the ‘‘Ro¨schtigraben’’15, which
runs along the valley of the river Saane near the bilingual town of Freiburg/
Fribourg. Swiss–German ethnic origins stem from the Alemanni (a Germanic tribe),
while the Swiss–French are primarily descendants of Romanized Celts and
Burgundians (a Germanic tribe): language thus proxies well for ethnicity in
Switzerland (see Dorn et al. 2008). Hofstede characterizes the Swiss–German
character as being independent and skeptical towards a concentration of power and
the Swiss–French character (‘‘very similar to France’’) as being open to hierarchical
structures and strong leaders. Linguistic affiliation also affects the duration of
unemployment and voting behavior (Dorn et al. 2008; Bru¨gger et al. 2009).
Religion in Switzerland is not affected by the language divide, but can instead be
differentiated between rural and urban areas. In rural areas (e.g., Eastern and Central
Switzerland or the Alps) Roman Catholicism is predominant. The four major Swiss
cities (Zurich, Geneva, Basel, and the capital Berne) are all Protestant. Zurich and
Geneva are also famous for being the domains of the renowned reformers, Zwingli
and Calvin, respectively, who introduced the Protestant Church in the 16th
century.16 The last civil war in Switzerland in 1847 resulted from a conflict between
the conservative Roman Catholic cantons and the mostly Protestant liberal cantons
and ended in the federal constitution of 1848. The federal constitution guarantees
freedom of religion and conscience, and no significant conflicts have been noted
since then. Weber (1930) argues that the Protestant work ethic is an important factor
for economic activity. This may be one reason why Switzerland is home to a
number of large multinational firms which cluster around the major cities. Examples
include ABB, Novartis, Roche, and UBS (German-speaking region); and Adecco,
Nestle´, Richemont, and SGS (French-speaking region). Furthermore, Swiss firms in
general rely on large-scale exports and quite often produce worldwide, which is also
a consequence of Switzerland’s small home market. At least since the 1990s, Swiss
corporate governance has been directed towards protecting shareholder interests
(Wymeersch 1998; Lu¨pold and Schnyder 2009), as is the case in Anglo-Saxon
countries.
15 ‘‘Ro¨schti’’ is a famous Swiss potato dish. ‘‘Graben’’ is the German word for ditch.
16 Johannes Calvin’s (1509–1564) doctrines were proclaimed from Geneva in the French-speaking part
of Switzerland. At about the same time, another important reformer Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531) was
teaching in German-speaking Zurich.
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3.2 Data
We target all firms included in the Swiss Performance Index (SPI) from 2005 to
2009. The SPI is the main index of the SIX Swiss Exchange. In total, 18 firm-years
from the Italian part of Switzerland (of which 2 firms/10 firm-years are utilities) are
excluded from the analysis. We exclude regulated industries (utilities and banks) as
well as financial services (see Booth et al. 2002). The corporate governance of firms
in regulated industries is affected by various stakeholders (e.g., regulators or
politicians). In addition, they are typically controlled by the state. Banks are
obligated to have two-tier boards, and financial firms in general exhibit non-
comparable corporate structures (e.g., grade of diversification, debt-to-assets ratio).
Otherwise, all firms are subject to the same legal environment (e.g., corporate law,
stock exchange regulation). Our final sample consists of 753 firm-years of which
631 firm-years (84 %) are Swiss–German and 122 firms-years (16 %) are Swiss–
French. Of this total, 517 firm-years (69 %) stem from Protestant cantons and 236
(31 %) from Roman Catholic cantons. Information about the corporations’
headquarters and the year of incorporation has been obtained from the commercial
register. Information about boards, their directors, and ownership has been gathered
from annual reports. In some cases, additional information about directors has been
obtained from BoardEx and newspapers. The financial data is from Thomson Reuter
Datastream.
3.3 Definition of Variables
3.3.1 Culture Variables
We use two proxies for culture: language and religion. Both variables are identified
on the basis of the firm’s headquarters. Swiss–French area equals 1 if the firm is
located in the French-speaking part of Switzerland, and 0 otherwise (i.e. German-
speaking). Roman Catholic canton equals 1 if the firm is located in a mainly Roman
Catholic state, and 0 otherwise (i.e., Protestant). We define cantons as being Roman
Catholic where ‘‘All Saints’ Day’’ is a bank holiday.
3.3.2 Corporate Governance Variables
We focus on two main corporate governance mechanisms: board structure and
ownership structure. Both are important control devices in a corporation and are the
subject of numerous studies. Board structure has two characteristics: one-tier board
equals 1 if the board consists of at least one executive director, and 0 otherwise
(two-tier board). German-speaking/French-speaking measures the fraction of
German- or French-speaking directors and accounts for board composition.
The ownership structure is measured using the cumulated voting rights of all
large shareholders. Large shareholders have more than 3 % of the voting rights.17
17 In 2005, the threshold for ‘‘significant’’ (large) shareholders was 5 %. However, this change had no
particular influence on cumulated voting rights in any of the cultural areas.
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Multiple classes of equity is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm
has more than one class of equity outstanding, and 0 otherwise. The deviation from
one share-one class typically leads to a situation where one shareholder can
dominate co-shareholders.
3.3.3 Control Variables
Empirical studies have shown that corporate governance structure is affected by the
business’ environment (see, e.g., Boone et al. 2007; Coles et al. 2008; Linck et al.
2008; Lehn et al. 2009). For instance, younger, smaller, focused firms with higher
sales growth and which potentially operate in a more volatile environment may
benefit from boards that are composed by insiders because they can more easily
transmit information to non-executive outsiders. We regard corporate governance as
a function of a firm’s cultural, regulatory and operational environment. We therefore
include four control variables that we regard as exogenous determinants of
corporate governance: firm age, sales growth, diversified, and firm size. In addition,
we employ industry fixed effects for three different industries.
Firm age is the year of the firm’s establishment minus the current year (plus 1).
Following Black and Khanna (2007), sales growth is the geometric mean of annual
sales growth over four periods, and firm size is the book value of total assets (total
liabilities and the shareholder equity). We use logarithms for both firm age and firm
size to account for skewness of the variables. Diversified is a dummy variable that
takes on the value of 1 if the firm reports more than one business segment, and 0
otherwise. We include three dummy variables for healthcare, consumer, and
industrials to account for industry effects.
4 Analyses and Results
4.1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables in our analysis. Over all
3 years, 16.20 % of all firms were located in the Swiss–French area. The proportion
is 0.78 %-points higher in 2005 than in 2009. In the same period, 31.34 % of all
firms were located in Roman Catholic cantons, which increased from 30.56 % in
2005 to 31.13 % in 2009. Our corporate governance variables evolved more
strongly over the period. About 56 % of all boards were one-tiered in 2005, but only
51 % in 2009.18 The cumulated voting rights increased notably from 40.86 % in
2005 to 46.18 % in 2009. This increase can be explained by new regulations
introduced in 2007 that demand that shareholders with significant stockholdings of
3 % instead of 5 % disclose their holdings. In the sample, no firm changed its
headquarters.
18 We investigated the 36 firms that changed their board structure (41 board changes) in 2005, 2007, and
2009. 24 board changes were from one-tier to two-tier and 17 from two-tier to one-tier. Only 3 board
changes occurred in the Swiss-French area. Boards of the 15 newly listed firms were mostly one-tiered.
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Table 2 presents results from Pearson’s correlation matrix. A high correlation of
over 0.7, which—as a rule of thumb––would usually lead to a multicollinearity
problem, is not observed. However, the analysis shows that firms in Swiss–French
areas are less likely to be in Roman Catholic cantons, and firms in Swiss–French
areas and Roman Catholic cantons are positively related with one-tier boards. In
addition, Swiss–French firms and firms in Roman Catholic cantons are more likely
to make use of multiple classes of equity.
4.2 Is Culture a Determinant of Board Structure?
We investigate the effect of culture on board structures using the fact that culture is
likely to affect the propensity to accept hierarchical structures. Table 3 presents
initial evidence on differences in board structure between boards in the four cultural
areas. An important difference becomes evident. Boards in the Swiss–French area
are more likely to be one-tiered. This difference is significant on the 1 % level for
both means and medians. However, this is not a result of the fact that the CEO and
chairman positions are likely to be combined in the French-speaking region as the
French PDG-model would suggest. Rather, the CEO is more likely to be present on
the board as an ordinary board member. In addition, there are more executives
(including the CEO) on the boards of Swiss–French firms. Similarly, boards in
Roman Catholic cantons are more likely to be one-tiered and have a higher
proportion of executive directors than boards in Protestant cantons.
However, the firms that operate in the cultural areas may have some common
characteristics that affect board structure. Therefore, we have to account for factors
other than culture that may affect the choice of the board structure. In Table 4, we
estimate a Logit model of board structure (1 = one-tier board, 0 = two-tier board)
using both Swiss–French area and Roman Catholic canton as explanatory variables
and employ five control variables in addition to industry effects that are likely to
influence board structure and may differ across our cultural proxies.
The analysis shows that firms in the French-speaking part of Switzerland and in
Roman Catholic cantons are significantly more likely to have a one-tiered board
structure (Column II). The two cultural variables increase the explanatory power of
the models by almost 4 % (4.6 %, Column I and 8.5 %, Column II). This result
holds for most of the time period (Columns III to VII). In other words, Swiss–
German boards and boards in Protestant cantons are more likely to be two-tiered.
The boards are structured in the same way as in Germany. Power is separated into a
supervisory and a management board. Therefore, we cannot reject Hypotheses 1 that
one-tier boards are more prevalent in the French-speaking area and in Roman
Catholic cantons. The cultural effect that both proxies are likely to accept
hierarchical structures cannot be rejected.
The figures in Table 5 indicate that the compositions of the boards are likely to
differ as a consequence of language barriers. There is a higher representation of
French-speaking directors (French citizens and directors who have graduated from
Swiss–French universities) on corporate boards in the Swiss–French area. Similarly,
German-speaking directors (German or Austrian citizens and directors who have
graduated from Swiss–German universities) are prevalent on Swiss–German boards.
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Interestingly, diversity (i.e., the fraction of women and foreigners) is almost
identical in both linguistic regions, but lower in Roman Catholic cantons. It is very
difficult to observe the religion of all board directors and whether they are practicing
religion or not. However, the lower fraction of foreigners on boards in Roman
Catholic cantons could be an indicator that trust plays a role in the selection of more
familiar directors. In contrast, other more functional director characteristics (e.g.,
education) do not show consistent differences across the two language regions.
The results from Table 5 can be confirmed in regression models (Table 6) which
include control variables for the nationality of shareholders. Hypotheses 2 cannot be
rejected, because board composition differs in the two language regions. German-
speaking directors are more prevalent on Swiss–German boards and French-
speaking directors are more prevalent on Swiss–French boards. This result is
interesting, because in an increasingly globalized market where English is the
predominant business language, language (and culture) may still play a role.
Admittedly, the fact that a director is educated at a Swiss–French university does
not entirely imply that he or she is French-speaking. For instance, German-speaking
directors might have attended a Swiss–French university, and vice versa. However,
evidence from Switzerland shows that students are attracted by the universities that
are most familiar to them.
4.3 Is Culture a Determinant of Ownership Structure?
Ownership is the most frequently discussed mechanism in comparative corporate
governance. Cross-country heterogeneity in corporate ownership has mainly been
explained by differences in legal origin. In fact, the figures in Table 7 suggest that
there are no differences in ownership structure across cultures. Swiss firms in
general exhibit a rather high level of cumulated voting rights (around 44 %).
However, there are tendencies that suggest a familiar (or local) bias (see Grinblatt
and Keloharju 2001; Becker et al. 2008; Kang and Kim 2008). The Germans have a
higher number voting rights in Swiss–German firms and the French a higher number
of voting rights in Swiss–French firms. In addition, in the French-speaking part of
Switzerland and in Roman Catholic cantons, multiple classes of equity are more
prevalent than in the German-speaking part of Switzerland and in Protestant
cantons. This ownership structure typically leads to more voting rights relative to
cash flow rights.
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) and logit regression estimations to examine
the cultural effect of language and religion on ownership structure in Tables 8 and
9.
As the results in Tables 8 and 9 show, we find no consistent significant results
over all 5 years. In consequence, we reject Hypothesis 3a that ownership
concentration is higher in the French-speaking part of Switzerland and in Roman
Catholic cantons. In line with Boubraki et al. (2011), the legal system may be a
more important determinant of ownership structure than culture. Multiple-class
firms are more prevalent in Roman Catholic cantons relative to Protestant cantons.
However, we also reject Hypothesis 3b that firms in Roman Catholic cantons and
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Swiss–French areas are more likely to have multiple-class equity structures because
the results are not consistent over the whole period.
4.4 Robustness
Our models are not subject to multicollinearity as indicated by the correlation
matrix (see Table 2) and the variance inflation factors for our regression models do
not exceed 2. To mitigate the omnipresent threat of heteroskedasticity, we routinely
estimated all our models using Huber–White’s robust standard errors (White 1980).
Endogeneity is often a problem in studies on corporate governance. Investigating
the effect of language and religion on corporate governance, we assume that reverse
causality is not a problem in our analysis. Since the variables that we use as proxies
for culture are time-invariant, we must abandon the use of firm fixed effects,
however, by including an array of potential control variables, we mitigate the
problem of omitted variable bias.
As a robustness check, we analyze our models by including additional control
variables that potentially affect corporate governance (see e.g., Coles et al. 2008;
Linck et al. 2008): family-control is 1 if a firm is controlled by a family or a private
person who owns 20 % or more of voting rights (see Faccio and Lang 2002).
Performance is measured using Tobin’s Q, which is calculated as total assets plus
market value of equity minus total equity divided by total assets which we use as an
approximation of replacement value. Leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt
to the book value of total assets. Furthermore, we include Beta as a proxy for a
firm’s risk and time fixed effects in our models. Table 10 shows that the additional
control variables do not affect the results produced by our standard models at all.
The results remain almost the same (This is equally true if we estimate every model
per year).
5 Conclusions
Corporate governance deals with conflicts of interest within corporations. The
corporation is the predominant form of legal structure that firms adopt around the
world, while corporate governance practices differ. In this study, we investigate
whether culture affects corporate governance using Switzerland as a particularly
interesting case since within a single institutional setting, the country is both
multilingual and multireligious. Specifically, we examine differences in corporate
governance structures between the German-speaking part of Switzerland and the
French-speaking part of Switzerland, as well as differences between Roman
Catholic cantons and Protestant cantons (states).
The fact that both proxies for culture are measured within one nation allows us to
isolate culture from other institutional factors. For instance, the legal system and the
political system as well as their interaction have been proven to be important
determinants of corporate governance at a country-level. In Europe, welfare
capitalism, state influence and family ownership all affect corporate governance
practices. These factors hamper results when comparing corporate governance
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systems in cross-country studies. In Switzerland, all regions share one and the same
federal corporate law. Also political decisions concerning corporate law influence
firms only at a country-level (and not in their headquarters’ locations). In addition,
Swiss corporate law is rather flexible and allows firm-specific optimizations in
corporate governance structures which may be influenced by culture.
Swiss–Germans and Swiss–French, Roman Catholics and Protestants have
distinct values, beliefs, and norms. The four groups have different biases towards
hierarchy. Particularly, within Hofstede’s concept of cultural dimensions, the main
difference between the culture of the Swiss–Germans and the Swiss–French is
manifested in their scores on power distance which is related to hierarchy. In
contrast to finance literature which is mainly concerned with risk aversion or
uncertainty avoidance, we relate power distance to corporate governance structures.
While the Swiss–Germans and Protestants are less hierarchical, the Swiss–French
and Roman Catholics tend to tolerate hierarchical structures.
Our study shows that boards are very likely to be influenced by culture.
Swiss–German boards and boards in Protestant cantons are commonly observed
to have a two-tiered board structure. This type of board structure is also used in
Germany. This structural feature, which strictly separates the supervisory board
from the management board, assists in preventing the concentration of power
that occurs in one-tier boards. In the Swiss–French area and in Roman Catholic
cantons, one-tier boards are more prevalent, which necessarily results in
concentrations of power. By confirming these observations, our study demon-
strates that firms opt for board structures that correspond to their cultural
identity. Furthermore, we find evidence that board composition is influenced by
language. Directors are active in firms where they share a common first
language which is also the regional language of the corporation’s headquarters.
This conjunction of cultural factors suggests that trust may play a role, as well
as the fact that the (national) market for directors is segmented. In contrast to
these factors, ownership concentration and the prevalence of multiple classes of
equity are not consistently related to culture. Nevertheless, there is a tendency
that Swiss–French firms have a lower level of cumulated voting rights, while
firms in Roman Catholic cantons are more likely to have issued more than one
class of equity.
While Hofstede (2013) provides statistical evidence on differences between the
Swiss–Germans and the Swiss–French, our study shows that differences in
corporate governance practices exist across cultures in Switzerland. An investiga-
tion of the effect of culture on business practices and corporate governance is
important, since firms reflect the fact that they are governed, managed and run by
people. Both practitioners and academics acknowledge the importance of culture in
international business, trade and cross-border transactions. Similarly, regulators and
legislators might be aware of the importance of culture for the implementation of
specific corporate governance practices around the world. However, how and why
culture affects corporate governance is less apparent. Furthermore, globalization has
led to an awareness of national differences in the legal, institutional, and regulatory
frameworks underpinning corporate governance systems.
Culture and Corporate Governance 103
123
T
a
b
le
6
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s:
b
o
ar
d
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
G
er
m
an
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
F
re
n
ch
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
G
er
m
an
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
F
re
n
ch
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
2
0
0
5
–
2
0
0
9
2
0
0
5
(I
)
(I
I)
(I
II
)
(I
V
)
(I
n
te
rc
ep
t)
0
.2
6
1
3
8
(0
.0
7
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
0
8
6
9
(0
.0
3
8
)
0
.3
1
6
4
6
(0
.1
6
4
)
(*
)
-
0
.0
3
1
8
6
(0
.0
8
5
)
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
-
0
.3
1
0
8
0
(0
.0
2
7
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
3
6
6
1
(0
.0
2
4
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.3
0
4
6
7
(0
.0
6
5
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
3
1
2
4
(0
.0
5
6
)
(*
*
*
)
F
re
n
ch
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.5
8
3
2
4
(0
.3
1
0
)
(*
)
0
.6
3
3
7
0
(0
.8
2
1
)
G
er
m
an
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.3
5
6
3
9
(0
.0
7
6
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.3
2
6
4
4
(0
.2
3
0
)
lo
g
F
ir
m
ag
e
0
.0
5
5
9
3
(0
.0
0
8
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
0
1
9
1
(0
.0
0
6
)
0
.0
5
3
4
5
(0
.0
2
0
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
0
0
3
8
(0
.0
1
2
)
S
al
es
g
ro
w
th
-
0
.0
8
5
7
1
(0
.0
4
2
)
(*
*
)
0
.0
3
6
4
4
(0
.0
2
9
)
-
0
.1
1
2
1
5
(0
.1
4
9
)
0
.1
5
6
5
8
(0
.0
8
6
)
(*
)
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
0
.1
0
5
9
2
(0
.0
2
2
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
1
0
6
0
(0
.0
1
3
)
0
.1
2
0
4
7
(0
.0
5
4
)
(*
*
)
-
0
.0
1
5
0
0
(0
.0
3
4
)
lo
g
T
o
ta
l
as
se
ts
0
.0
0
6
2
2
(0
.0
0
5
)
0
.0
0
2
7
0
(0
.0
0
3
)
0
.0
0
3
9
3
(0
.0
1
2
)
0
.0
0
6
1
0
(0
.0
0
6
)
In
d
u
st
ry
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
M
u
lt
ip
le
R
2
3
3
.8
1
%
3
0
.2
9
%
3
5
.3
2
%
3
3
.5
2
%
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
3
3
.0
0
%
2
9
.4
4
%
3
0
.9
7
%
2
9
.0
6
%
F
st
at
is
ti
cs
4
2
.1
6
*
*
*
3
5
.8
7
*
*
*
8
.1
3
*
*
*
7
.5
1
*
*
*
104 C. Volonte´
123
T
a
b
le
6
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
G
er
m
an
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
F
re
n
ch
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
G
er
m
an
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
F
re
n
ch
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
9
(V
)
(V
I)
(V
II
)
(V
II
I)
(I
n
te
rc
ep
t)
0
.1
8
1
4
7
(0
.1
6
6
)
0
.0
2
5
7
0
(0
.1
0
1
)
0
.3
2
5
9
8
(0
.1
8
6
)
(*
)
-
0
.0
0
4
6
7
(0
.0
9
1
)
(*
)
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
-
0
.3
0
7
0
2
(0
.0
6
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
3
6
5
3
(0
.0
5
8
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.3
0
7
7
1
(0
.0
7
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
4
5
3
9
(0
.0
6
0
)
(*
*
*
)
F
re
n
ch
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.3
9
1
9
6
(1
.3
6
8
)
0
.6
2
7
0
4
(0
.6
2
9
)
(*
*
)
G
er
m
an
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.2
6
2
8
9
(0
.1
9
6
)
0
.4
8
5
1
4
(0
.2
2
3
)
(*
*
)
lo
g
F
ir
m
ag
e
0
.0
4
8
3
8
(0
.0
2
0
)
(*
*
)
0
.0
0
0
4
9
(0
.0
1
6
)
(*
*
)
0
.0
6
1
5
7
(0
.0
1
8
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
0
5
2
5
(0
.0
1
3
)
(*
*
*
)
S
al
es
g
ro
w
th
-
0
.0
7
4
1
4
(0
.1
2
1
)
-
0
.0
2
9
0
8
(0
.0
9
8
)
-
0
.1
9
1
2
0
(0
.1
4
1
)
0
.0
0
4
4
1
(0
.1
2
5
)
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
0
.0
9
3
4
9
(0
.0
5
0
)
(*
)
-
0
.0
1
3
3
0
(0
.0
3
4
)
(*
)
0
.1
1
7
4
1
(0
.0
5
3
)
(*
*
)
-
0
.0
2
4
6
7
(0
.0
3
1
)
(*
*
)
lo
g
T
o
ta
l
as
se
ts
0
.0
1
4
5
2
(0
.0
1
1
)
0
.0
0
2
6
9
(0
.0
0
6
)
-
0
.0
0
1
9
3
(0
.0
1
3
)
0
.0
0
3
6
1
(0
.0
0
6
)
In
d
u
st
ry
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
M
u
lt
ip
le
R
2
3
3
.2
6
%
2
9
.2
8
%
3
3
.1
6
%
3
3
.1
1
%
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
2
9
.0
8
%
2
4
.8
6
%
2
8
.9
0
%
2
8
.8
4
%
F
st
at
is
ti
cs
7
.9
7
*
*
*
6
.6
3
*
*
*
7
.7
7
*
*
*
7
.7
5
*
*
*
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
b
o
ar
d
co
m
p
o
si
ti
o
n
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
7
5
3
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
fr
o
m
th
e
S
P
I
o
f
w
h
ic
h
6
3
1
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
G
er
m
an
ar
ea
an
d
1
2
2
fi
rm
s-
y
ea
rs
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
.
5
1
7
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
P
ro
te
st
an
t
ca
n
to
n
s
an
d
2
3
6
in
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
s.
W
h
it
e
(1
9
8
0
)
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
an
d
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
,
5
,
an
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
s
is
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
an
d
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
Culture and Corporate Governance 105
123
T
a
b
le
7
D
if
fe
re
n
ce
s
in
m
ea
n
s
an
d
m
ed
ia
n
s:
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
st
ru
ct
u
re
S
am
p
le
S
w
is
s–
G
er
m
an
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
t
te
st
/(
W
il
co
xo
n
-t
es
t)
7
5
3
6
3
1
1
2
2
1
0
0
.0
0
%
8
3
.8
0
%
1
6
.2
0
%
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
P
an
el
A
:
la
n
g
u
ag
e
C
u
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
4
3
.8
3
%
4
3
.9
2
%
4
3
.1
3
%
4
3
.3
8
%
4
7
.5
8
%
G
er
m
an
/A
u
st
ri
an
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
2
.8
0
%
3
.1
6
%
0
.0
0
%
0
.9
2
%
0
.0
0
%
*
*
*
/(
–
)
F
re
n
ch
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.5
0
%
0
.3
9
%
0
.0
0
%
1
.0
3
%
0
.0
0
%
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
L
ar
g
es
t
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
3
0
.9
4
%
3
0
.8
7
%
2
4
.9
0
%
3
1
.2
7
%
2
4
.0
0
%
S
ec
o
n
d
la
rg
es
t
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
6
.5
3
%
6
.6
8
%
5
.4
0
%
5
.7
3
%
5
.1
4
%
F
am
il
y
-c
o
n
tr
o
ll
ed
([
2
5
%
;
y
es
=
1
,
n
o
=
0
)
3
6
.2
5
%
3
5
.3
4
%
–
4
0
.9
8
%
–
W
id
el
y
-h
el
d
(\
2
5
%
;
y
es
=
1
,
n
o
=
0
)
5
1
.7
9
%
5
2
.1
4
%
–
5
0
.0
0
%
–
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
7
.6
7
%
7
.8
2
%
4
.5
0
%
6
.8
7
%
5
.0
0
%
A
n
g
lo
-S
ax
o
n
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
3
.1
2
%
3
.0
8
%
0
.0
0
%
3
.3
0
%
0
.0
0
%
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
b
lo
ck
h
o
ld
er
s
3
.0
3
.0
3
.0
3
.0
3
.0
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
(y
es
=
1
,
n
o
=
0
)
1
9
.2
6
%
1
6
.8
0
%
–
3
1
.9
7
%
–
*
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
106 C. Volonte´
123
T
a
b
le
7
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
S
am
p
le
P
ro
te
st
an
t
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
t
te
st
/(
W
il
co
xo
n
-t
es
t)
7
5
3
5
1
7
2
3
6
1
0
0
.0
0
%
6
8
.6
6
%
3
1
.3
4
%
M
ea
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
M
ea
n
M
ed
ia
n
P
an
el
B
:
re
li
g
io
n
C
u
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
4
3
.8
3
%
4
2
.8
6
%
4
2
.8
0
%
4
5
.9
6
%
4
7
.3
3
%
G
er
m
an
/A
u
st
ri
an
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
2
.8
0
%
2
.4
6
%
0
.0
0
%
3
.5
4
%
0
.0
0
%
F
re
n
ch
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.5
0
%
0
.7
1
%
0
.0
0
%
0
.0
2
%
0
.0
0
%
*
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
L
ar
g
es
t
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
3
0
.9
4
%
2
8
.4
4
%
2
1
.0
6
%
3
6
.4
1
%
3
4
.7
5
%
*
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
S
ec
o
n
d
la
rg
es
t
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
6
.5
3
%
6
.8
8
%
5
.4
4
%
5
.7
7
%
5
.2
0
%
*
*
*
/(
*
)
F
am
il
y
-c
o
n
tr
o
ll
ed
([
2
5
%
;
y
es
=
1
,
n
o
=
0
)
3
6
.2
5
%
3
2
.1
1
%
–
4
5
.3
4
%
–
*
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
W
id
el
y
-h
el
d
(\
2
5
%
;
y
es
=
1
,
n
o
=
0
)
5
1
.7
9
%
5
7
.6
4
%
–
3
8
.9
8
%
–
*
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
7
.6
7
%
7
.8
7
%
4
.8
1
%
7
.2
3
%
4
.7
2
%
A
n
g
lo
-S
ax
o
n
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
3
.1
2
%
3
.6
6
%
0
.0
0
%
1
.9
4
%
0
.0
0
%
*
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
N
u
m
b
er
o
f
b
lo
ck
h
o
ld
er
s
3
.0
3
.2
3
.0
2
.5
2
.0
*
*
*
/(
*
*
*
)
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
(y
es
=
1
,
n
o
=
0
)
1
9
.2
6
%
1
7
.0
2
%
–
2
4
.1
5
%
–
*
*
/(
*
*
)
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
co
m
p
ar
is
o
n
s
o
f
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
st
ru
ct
u
re
s
b
et
w
ee
n
fi
rm
s
in
S
w
is
s–
G
er
m
an
an
d
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
s
an
d
b
et
w
ee
n
fi
rm
s
in
P
ro
te
st
an
t
an
d
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
s.
T
h
e
eq
u
al
it
y
o
f
m
ea
n
s
is
te
st
ed
u
si
n
g
a
W
el
ch
T
w
o
S
am
p
le
t-
te
st
,
an
d
th
e
eq
u
al
it
y
o
f
m
ed
ia
n
s
is
te
st
ed
u
si
n
g
a
W
il
co
x
o
n
ra
n
k
su
m
-t
es
t
w
it
h
co
n
ti
n
u
it
y
co
rr
ec
ti
o
n
S
ig
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
,
5
,
an
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
s
is
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
an
d
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
Culture and Corporate Governance 107
123
T
a
b
le
8
O
L
S
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s:
cu
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
cu
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
2
0
0
5
–
2
0
0
9
2
0
0
5
(I
)
(I
I)
(I
II
)
(I
n
te
rc
ep
t)
0
.7
3
6
0
4
(0
.0
6
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.7
5
2
3
9
(0
.0
6
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.7
2
4
7
0
(0
.1
4
5
)
(*
*
*
)
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
-
0
.0
5
9
0
4
(0
.0
2
0
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
9
5
3
0
(0
.0
5
3
)
(*
)
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
-
0
.0
0
0
7
4
(0
.0
1
8
)
-
0
.0
1
5
6
7
(0
.0
4
5
)
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
0
.2
1
4
5
1
(0
.0
2
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
2
0
7
4
(0
.0
2
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
6
8
3
4
(0
.0
4
7
)
(*
*
*
)
lo
g
F
ir
m
ag
e
0
.0
0
2
3
3
(0
.0
0
8
)
0
.0
0
2
7
6
(0
.0
0
8
)
0
.0
0
2
4
6
(0
.0
2
0
)
S
al
es
g
ro
w
th
0
.1
2
4
1
7
(0
.0
4
1
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
2
3
3
5
(0
.0
4
2
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
7
8
6
5
(0
.0
8
9
)
(*
*
)
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
0
.1
0
8
5
7
(0
.0
1
9
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
1
0
0
3
(0
.0
1
9
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
0
6
3
6
(0
.0
4
9
)
(*
*
)
lo
g
T
o
ta
l
as
se
ts
-
0
.0
3
6
2
0
(0
.0
0
4
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
3
6
9
9
(0
.0
0
4
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
3
6
7
1
(0
.0
1
0
)
(*
*
*
)
In
d
u
st
ry
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
M
u
lt
ip
le
R
2
2
7
.3
1
%
2
8
.0
8
%
3
1
.5
7
%
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
2
6
.5
3
%
2
7
.1
1
%
2
6
.4
2
%
F
st
at
is
ti
cs
3
4
.9
4
*
*
*
2
8
.9
6
*
*
*
6
.1
4
*
*
*
108 C. Volonte´
123
T
a
b
le
8
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
cu
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
(I
V
)
(V
)
(V
I)
(V
II
)
(I
n
te
rc
ep
t)
0
.6
5
5
6
2
(0
.1
3
9
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.7
5
6
6
0
(0
.1
3
8
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.8
1
6
6
2
(0
.1
4
2
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.8
3
4
7
3
(0
.1
5
4
)
(*
*
*
)
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
-
0
.0
5
8
3
5
(0
.0
5
0
)
-
0
.0
5
8
3
4
(0
.0
4
6
)
-
0
.0
4
9
8
7
(0
.0
4
6
)
-
0
.0
2
8
7
7
(0
.0
4
6
)
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
0
.0
0
3
0
7
(0
.0
4
2
)
0
.0
1
1
8
3
(0
.0
4
0
)
0
.0
0
2
5
5
(0
.0
3
9
)
-
0
.0
0
2
2
7
(0
.0
4
1
)
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
0
.2
4
8
6
6
(0
.0
4
8
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
9
9
3
1
(0
.0
4
9
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
0
1
6
7
(0
.0
4
9
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
8
5
8
9
(0
.0
5
1
)
(*
*
*
)
lo
g
F
ir
m
ag
e
0
.0
0
6
2
6
(0
.0
1
8
)
0
.0
0
7
2
1
(0
.0
1
8
)
0
.0
0
0
2
8
(0
.0
1
8
)
-
0
.0
0
3
1
0
(0
.0
1
6
)
S
al
es
g
ro
w
th
0
.1
6
5
8
8
(0
.0
7
4
)
(*
*
)
0
.0
9
9
5
5
(0
.1
3
5
)
0
.0
5
1
6
0
(0
.0
9
4
)
0
.1
6
5
2
8
(0
.1
1
6
)
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
0
.1
3
5
3
1
(0
.0
4
6
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
2
2
8
4
(0
.0
4
5
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
9
6
8
1
(0
.0
4
4
)
(*
*
)
0
.1
0
0
9
3
(0
.0
4
1
)
(*
*
)
lo
g
T
o
ta
l
as
se
ts
-
0
.0
3
4
2
4
(0
.0
1
0
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
3
9
1
3
(0
.0
0
9
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
3
9
1
3
(0
.0
0
9
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
3
7
9
2
(0
.0
1
0
)
(*
*
*
)
In
d
u
st
ry
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
M
u
lt
ip
le
R
2
3
0
.9
4
%
2
9
.1
1
%
2
8
.8
5
%
2
7
.5
0
%
A
d
ju
st
ed
R
2
2
5
.9
3
%
2
4
.1
5
%
2
3
.9
1
%
2
2
.3
2
%
F
st
at
is
ti
cs
6
.1
8
*
*
*
5
.8
7
*
*
*
5
.8
4
*
*
*
5
.3
1
*
*
*
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
re
g
re
ss
io
n
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
cu
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
7
5
3
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
fr
o
m
th
e
S
P
I
o
f
w
h
ic
h
6
3
1
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
G
er
m
an
ar
ea
an
d
1
2
2
fi
rm
s-
y
ea
rs
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
.
5
1
7
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
P
ro
te
st
an
t
ca
n
to
n
s
an
d
2
3
6
in
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
s.
W
h
it
e
(1
9
8
0
)
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
an
d
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
,
5
,
an
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
s
is
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
an
d
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
Culture and Corporate Governance 109
123
T
a
b
le
9
L
o
g
it
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s:
m
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
2
0
0
5
–
2
0
0
9
2
0
0
5
(I
)
(I
I)
(I
II
)
(I
n
te
rc
ep
t)
-
3
.9
9
8
3
6
(0
.9
1
3
)
(*
*
*
)
-
5
.3
7
2
5
8
(0
.9
7
9
)
(*
*
*
)
-
5
.2
7
1
8
9
(2
.3
4
0
)
(*
*
)
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
1
.0
2
2
7
6
(0
.2
8
1
)
(*
*
*
)
1
.0
4
7
8
2
(0
.6
6
9
)
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
0
.9
1
7
0
1
(0
.2
1
3
)
(*
*
*
)
1
.0
3
3
7
0
(0
.5
2
8
)
(*
)
lo
g
F
ir
m
ag
e
0
.3
2
1
2
9
(0
.0
9
3
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.3
5
2
2
7
(0
.0
9
7
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
7
3
2
7
(0
.2
3
0
)
S
al
es
g
ro
w
th
-
1
.7
8
3
4
7
(0
.8
1
2
)
(*
*
)
-
1
.7
0
1
0
9
(0
.8
3
3
)
(*
*
)
0
.0
4
7
3
6
(1
.7
2
5
)
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
0
.0
0
3
4
7
(0
.2
4
6
)
0
.0
7
6
2
8
(0
.2
4
7
)
0
.1
4
4
2
3
(0
.6
0
2
)
lo
g
T
o
ta
l
as
se
ts
0
.0
3
7
0
3
(0
.0
5
7
)
0
.0
8
0
8
3
(0
.0
6
0
)
0
.1
0
1
4
1
(0
.1
4
3
)
In
d
u
st
ry
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
M
cF
ad
d
en
R
2
7
.9
6
%
9
.5
3
%
9
.5
3
%
110 C. Volonte´
123
T
a
b
le
9
co
n
ti
n
ed
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
:
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
(I
V
)
(V
)
(V
I)
(V
II
)
(I
n
te
rc
ep
t)
-
5
.7
2
1
5
4
(2
.5
2
5
)
(*
*
)
-
5
.9
6
5
5
7
(2
.3
8
7
)
(*
*
)
-
5
.8
6
4
9
3
(2
.3
8
0
)
(*
*
)
-
4
.6
0
6
8
2
(2
.3
9
0
)
(*
)
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
1
.0
4
0
1
6
(0
.6
9
6
)
0
.9
6
3
0
1
(0
.6
9
1
)
1
.0
5
5
0
5
(0
.6
9
6
)
1
.0
3
0
2
0
(0
.6
9
9
)
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
0
.8
0
8
7
2
(0
.5
1
4
)
0
.8
0
7
3
7
(0
.5
0
6
)
0
.8
9
0
1
1
(0
.5
2
4
)
(*
)
1
.0
6
8
5
0
(0
.5
1
7
)
(*
*
)
lo
g
F
ir
m
ag
e
0
.3
3
6
2
6
(0
.2
3
4
)
0
.3
8
6
9
7
(0
.2
3
4
)
(*
)
0
.3
8
2
6
7
(0
.2
3
8
)
0
.3
9
1
3
3
(0
.2
3
6
)
(*
)
S
al
es
g
ro
w
th
-
2
.5
6
7
8
2
(2
.1
0
7
)
-
2
.8
6
0
0
8
(2
.1
6
0
)
-
2
.9
9
2
4
1
(2
.0
7
2
)
-
0
.5
1
6
0
7
(1
.7
0
5
)
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
-
0
.0
3
1
1
7
(0
.6
0
6
)
0
.0
1
5
6
0
(0
.5
9
7
)
0
.0
3
4
0
2
(0
.5
9
1
)
0
.1
8
7
6
8
(0
.5
9
0
)
lo
g
T
o
ta
l
as
se
ts
0
.1
1
2
3
1
(0
.1
5
2
)
0
.1
1
6
6
4
(0
.1
4
5
)
0
.1
0
5
3
2
(0
.1
4
4
)
0
.0
0
1
2
7
(0
.1
4
9
)
In
d
u
st
ry
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
M
cF
ad
d
en
R
2
1
2
.2
2
%
1
3
.2
7
%
1
3
.7
6
%
9
.7
3
%
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
re
g
re
ss
io
n
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
es
fo
r
cu
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
7
5
3
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
fr
o
m
th
e
S
P
I
o
f
w
h
ic
h
6
3
1
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
G
er
m
an
ar
ea
an
d
1
2
2
fi
rm
s-
y
ea
rs
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
.
5
1
7
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
P
ro
te
st
an
t
ca
n
to
n
s
an
d
2
3
6
in
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
s.
W
h
it
e
(1
9
8
0
)
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
an
d
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
,
5
,
an
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
s
is
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
an
d
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
Culture and Corporate Governance 111
123
T
ab
le
1
0
R
o
b
u
st
n
es
s
te
st
s
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
(L
o
g
it
)
(O
L
S
)
(O
L
S
)
(O
L
S
)
(L
o
g
it
)
O
n
e-
ti
er
b
o
ar
d
G
er
m
an
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
F
re
n
ch
-s
p
ea
k
in
g
C
u
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
(I
)
(I
I)
(I
II
)
(I
V
)
(V
)
(I
n
te
rc
ep
t)
1
.6
6
5
6
5
(0
.7
8
8
)
(*
*
)
0
.3
1
1
7
2
(0
.0
8
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
0
3
7
3
(0
.0
4
5
)
0
.6
9
3
1
8
(0
.0
7
4
)
(*
*
*
)
-
5
.3
3
1
4
7
(1
.1
1
3
)
(*
*
*
)
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
1
.4
0
0
6
4
(0
.2
3
4
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.3
0
5
4
2
(0
.0
2
6
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.2
3
7
2
1
(0
.0
2
3
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
5
9
9
3
(0
.0
2
1
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.9
7
9
6
4
(0
.2
9
1
)
(*
*
*
)
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
0
.6
5
0
3
3
(0
.1
8
6
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
1
7
8
5
(0
.0
1
7
)
0
.8
6
1
2
0
(0
.2
3
0
)
(*
*
*
)
F
re
n
ch
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.6
6
2
2
6
(0
.3
5
8
)
(*
)
G
er
m
an
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
0
.3
8
5
5
4
(0
.0
8
0
)
(*
*
*
)
M
u
lt
ip
le
cl
as
se
s
o
f
eq
u
it
y
0
.2
1
5
8
9
(0
.0
2
0
)
(*
*
*
)
C
u
m
u
la
te
d
v
o
ti
n
g
ri
g
h
ts
-
0
.6
2
9
0
0
(0
.4
6
0
)
lo
g
F
ir
m
ag
e
-
0
.1
1
6
6
5
(0
.0
8
7
)
0
.0
5
1
3
9
(0
.0
0
9
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
0
1
8
9
(0
.0
0
6
)
-
0
.0
0
2
4
6
(0
.0
0
7
)
0
.3
8
2
7
6
(0
.1
0
1
)
(*
*
*
)
S
al
es
g
ro
w
th
2
.3
3
1
3
7
(0
.5
7
1
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
5
8
1
3
(0
.0
4
2
)
0
.0
2
9
9
6
(0
.0
2
9
)
0
.1
4
9
9
7
(0
.0
4
4
)
(*
*
*
)
-
1
.6
1
1
7
6
(0
.9
3
5
)
(*
)
D
iv
er
si
fi
ed
-
0
.1
5
9
4
9
(0
.2
0
5
)
0
.0
8
9
2
9
(0
.0
2
3
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
1
3
4
1
(0
.0
1
3
)
0
.0
9
9
3
6
(0
.0
1
8
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
8
1
0
0
(0
.2
5
6
)
lo
g
T
o
ta
l
as
se
ts
-
0
.1
4
3
2
5
(0
.0
5
2
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
1
6
5
7
(0
.0
0
6
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
0
1
5
5
(0
.0
0
4
)
-
0
.0
2
0
9
5
(0
.0
0
5
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
2
7
8
2
(0
.0
8
4
)
F
am
il
y
-c
o
n
tr
o
l
0
.2
7
1
1
0
(0
.2
1
4
)
0
.0
2
2
4
1
(0
.0
2
0
)
0
.0
1
9
9
0
(0
.0
1
2
)
(*
)
P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
0
.1
4
9
7
3
(0
.1
1
8
)
-
0
.0
4
3
6
8
(0
.0
1
3
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
0
2
6
2
(0
.0
0
8
)
-
0
.0
2
9
3
2
(0
.0
1
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.0
6
3
6
1
(0
.1
7
4
)
R
is
k
0
.2
8
4
6
2
(0
.2
4
1
)
-
0
.0
3
7
7
1
(0
.0
2
6
)
0
.0
0
3
4
6
(0
.0
1
7
)
-
0
.1
1
4
1
9
(0
.0
2
5
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.2
0
2
3
2
(0
.3
3
2
)
L
ev
er
ag
e
0
.6
0
0
3
6
(0
.4
1
9
)
-
0
.1
4
1
4
0
(0
.0
5
0
)
(*
*
*
)
0
.1
3
3
7
7
(0
.0
3
3
)
(*
*
*
)
-
0
.0
9
1
9
0
(0
.0
4
2
)
(*
*
)
-
1
.1
8
6
7
9
(0
.9
6
9
)
In
d
u
st
ry
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
Y
ea
rs
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
In
cl
u
d
ed
T
h
e
ta
b
le
p
re
se
n
ts
ro
b
u
st
n
es
s
te
st
s
o
f
o
u
r
m
o
d
el
s.
T
h
e
sa
m
p
le
co
n
si
st
s
o
f
7
5
3
fi
rm
-y
ea
r
o
b
se
rv
at
io
n
s
fr
o
m
th
e
S
P
I
o
f
w
h
ic
h
6
3
1
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
G
er
m
an
ar
ea
an
d
1
2
2
fi
rm
s-
y
ea
rs
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
th
e
S
w
is
s–
F
re
n
ch
ar
ea
.
5
1
7
ar
e
lo
ca
te
d
in
P
ro
te
st
an
t
ca
n
to
n
s
an
d
2
3
6
in
R
o
m
an
C
at
h
o
li
c
ca
n
to
n
s.
W
h
it
e
(1
9
8
0
)
st
an
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
re
p
o
rt
ed
in
p
ar
en
th
es
es
,
an
d
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
at
th
e
1
,
5
,
an
d
1
0
%
le
v
el
s
is
in
d
ic
at
ed
b
y
*
*
*
,
*
*
,
an
d
*
,
re
sp
ec
ti
v
el
y
112 C. Volonte´
123
Several studies have perceived a hybridization of corporate governance
systems around the world, and culture is a crucial factor in this development.
However, it is essential to devise a scientific methodology that is capable of
disentangling culture from the institutional environment of a country and
identify causal effects. We provide empirical evidence that culture and values
related to tolerance for hierarchical structures directly affect board structure. In
this way, our study is important for research in the fields of international
business and corporate governance. Policies that are aimed at modifying
corporate governance regimes may not account for the fact that cultural values
have an impact on governance practices. An optimal corporate governance
regime, however, must be aligned to its respective business environment. In
addition, since such culturally-determined differences are present in the
corporate governance structures that exist in a small developed country like
Switzerland, then the corporate governance systems of other countries in
Europe and further afield economies are likely to reflect cultural characteristics,
as well. It is also important to understand the persistent regional cultural
differences which affect corporate governance regimes and business practices
throughout the world for economic success in an increasingly globalized
market. Regulators and activist shareholders should therefore be careful when
proposing corporate governance reforms that follow an Anglo-American logic.
Corporate governance reforms must take into account cultural differences when
modifications are aimed at implementing an effective corporate governance
mechanism.
However, the study has some limitations. First of all, the advantage of
investigating only one country because of its unique institutional setting is also
a disadvantage, because the effects of language and religion on culture may be
particular to Switzerland. In the same context, the sample size is relatively
small, investigating only about 150 firms each year. Some other considerations
are necessary. In contrast to culture, herd behavior and network effects may be
an explanation for why firms in some regions adhere to specific corporate
governance practices (see e.g., Kahan and Klausner 1996). It is conceivable that
Swiss–French and Swiss–German firms simply copy the corporate governance
practices of their direct neighbors and adhere to their business practices owing
to proximity. Switzerland’s case is particular. The study on Canada shows that
law is more important than culture in explaining ownership structure.
Nevertheless, intra-national differences in power distance exist in Italy for
instance (see Putnam 1993), and similar comparisons could be conducted in
other environments. Furthermore, our analysis is restricted to listed firms that
comply with national and international corporate governance standards. In
particular, large multinational corporations are subject to pressure from
institutional investors and the media to comply with best practices. We do
not know whether cultural differences are more distinctive in non-listed firms.
However, we suggest that corporate governance reformers should consider the
implications of interfering with cultural customs.
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Appendix
Table 11 Hofstede’s cultural dimensions
National cultural
dimensions
Switzerland Switzerland Germany France
German-speaking French-speaking
Power distance Decentralized
powers
Rather hierarchical
society
(26) (70) (34) (35) (68)
Individualism Individualistic society
(69) (64) (68) (67) (71)
Masculinity/
Feminity
Masculine society
(72) (58) (70) (66) (43)
Uncertainty
avoidance
Preference for
avoiding
uncertainty
Strong preference for
avoiding uncertainty
(56) (70) (58) (65) (86)
Long-term
orientation
Short-term orientation
(40) (40) (31) (39)
Source: Hofstede (2013)
Table 12 Population in Switzerland (2010)
Permanent resident population of Switzerlanda
Total 7,793,991 100.00 %
Swiss 6,103,857 78.31 %
German 263,271 3.38 %
French 95,643 1.23 %
Permanent resident population of canton Basel-Citya
Total 183,118 100.00 %
Swiss 124,865 68.19 %
German 13,897 7.59 %
French 1,365 0.75 %
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